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ABSTRACT 
 In May 2017, the Islamic State Philippines (IS-P) engaged the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines (AFP) in the city of Marawi in what became a violent, five-month battle 
that resulted in the death of 165 Filipino soldiers and policemen, 920 militants, and over 
47 civilians, along with the near total destruction of the city. This thesis aims to 
understand the conditions that led to the battle of Marawi, including which insurgent 
groups in Mindanao pledged the bayat to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—the 
oath of allegiance—and formed IS-P, and the resources these groups gained by aligning 
with ISIS. Using qualitative methods and visual analytics, the study reveals that ISIS 
gained a foothold in Mindanao by capitalizing on pre-existing Muslim insurgent groups 
that have historic grievances against the government. ISIS also brought important 
resources to the region, including foreign fighters, funding, social media support, and 
new tactics, techniques, and procedures. Ultimately, although the AFP ended the fighting 
in Marawi and eliminated two key insurgent leaders, the groups that formed IS-P and the 
underlying grievances still remain in Mindanao. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
Since the 1990s, the Philippines has faced numerous threats from insurgent and 
terrorist organizations that have thrived in undergoverned regions. Mindanao, the second 
largest island in the Philippines, has served as a safe haven for transnational terrorist 
groups, including al-Qaeda (AQ), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and the recently arrived Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).1 The porous island region of the Sulu Archipelago, 
spanning from Muslim-majority Malaysia and Indonesia, to the Sulu and Celebes Seas, to 
Mindanao, in particular, provides a security vacuum that jihadist groups have exploited in 
a number of ways: to move personnel and equipment, to recruit fighters, and to gain 
popular support through longstanding political and social grievances.2  
Beginning in 2014, several preexisting jihadist groups in Mindanao pledged the 
bayat, or an oath of allegiance, to ISIS, including Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Ansar 
Khilafah Philippines (AKP), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and the 
Maute Group.3 By 2016, ISIS leadership formally recognized these groups, designating 
them the “harbingers” of Daulah Islamiyah Wilayatul Mashriq, or Islamic State in the 
Eastern Asia Region. Isnilon Hapilon, a former leader of ASG, took on the leadership of 
these groups as the emir of a prospective wilayah, or governorate, in Southeast Asia.4 
The Philippine government and its allies named this new alliance with ISIS and groups in 
Mindanao the Islamic State of the Philippines (IS-P). Alongside this newly formed 
collaborative between historically divided groups in the region, ISIS provided funding 
                                                 
1 Richard Javad Heydarian, “Crisis in Mindanao,” Aljazeera Centre for Studies. August 6, 2017, 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2017/8/6/b03ba3f98f124b4ca3aa27b08d2740f1_100.pdf. 
2 William McCants, “The Polarizing Effect of Islamic State Aggression on the Global Jihadist 
Movement," CTC Sentinel 9, no. 7 (July 2016) accessed September 12, 2017, 21, 
https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-polarizing-effect-of-islamic-state-aggression-on-the-global-jihadist-
movement. 
3 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Marawi, The "East Asia Wilayah" and Indonesia," IPAC 
Report 38 (2017), 3. See also: Peter Chalk, “The Islamic State in the Philippines: A Looming Shadow in 
Southeast Asia?," CTC-Sentinel 9, no. 3 (March 17, 2016) accessed May 30, 2018, 12, 
https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-islamic-state-in-the-philippines-a-looming-shadow-in-southeast-asia. 
4 Heydarian, “Crisis in Mindanao,” 4. 
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and encouraged foreign fighters to come to Mindanao to help create an independent 
Islamic State. These fighters brought with them new tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) that they had learned in Iraq and Syria. Together, this new alliance and the 
resources provided by ISIS made IS-P a formidable force. 
IS-P displayed its newfound capabilities in what became known as the Siege of 
Marawi, which began in May of 2017 when a joint operation of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) attempted to arrest Isnilon 
Hapilon, the leader of IS-P. In this initial confrontation, government troops encountered 
an unexpected level of resistance in a battle that extended for five months, until the fall of 
2017. These violent clashes yielded a large number of casualties and thousands of 
civilians displaced from the city.1 The humanitarian crisis, coupled with the violent ISIS 
expansion into Mindanao, was not only an important challenge for the Philippines, but 
also for the region, especially neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia, which also had a 
growing ISIS presence and considerable geographic challenges for stemming the tide of 
foreign and domestic fighters.2 
The rise of IS-P in Mindanao was also of great concern to the United States. ISIS 
advanced into the region following the dissolution of the U.S.-led Joint Special 
Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) in 2015, an effort manned primarily by 
First Special Forces Group (Airborne) beginning in 2001. Within a year of the Task 
Force’s disbanding, ISIS had moved into the region and helped form new alliances 
among previous rival groups. On September 1, 2017, during the middle of the Battle of 
Marawi, the U.S. Government named Operation Pacific Eagle- Philippines (OPE-P) as a 
contingency operation “to support the Philippine government and military in their efforts 
to isolate, degrade, and defeat Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) affiliates and other 
terrorist organizations in the Philippines.”5 Despite the reallocation of resources and 
advisors to the region, U.S. and Philippine military forces are still struggling with a 
                                                 
5 U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, “Lead Inspector General for Operation 
Inherent Resolve and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines,” Quarterly Report to the United States 





comprehensive strategy for combating the rise of ISIS in Mindanao and beyond. In order 
to develop this strategy, however, there must first be an understanding of the problem. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis investigates the following questions: What were the conditions under 
which ISIS emerged in Mindanao? How did ISIS come to have such a strong and 
growing presence in Mindanao? And what can the Philippine government and the United 
States learn from the Battle of Marawi about how to counter the presence of ISIS, as well 
as other potential transnational Islamist movements in the region?  
C. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses qualitative methods and visual analytics to better understand the 
emergence of ISIS in the Philippines. Specifically, this thesis provides an analysis of 
preexisting groups in Mindanao and the Southern Philippines that can help identify which 
groups have aligned with ISIS and why. This analysis brings context for how certain 
Islamic groups became a sanctioned franchise of ISIS, what they brought to the fight, and 
how aligning with ISIS brought new resources to the area, including funding, TTPs, and 
foreign fighters.  
Second, the thesis draws from primary sources to analyze ISIS TTPs in 
Mindanao, and particularly in the Battle of Marawi, and how these TTPs have evolved 
and differed from previous militant groups on the island. The thesis process traces the 
sequence of events leading up to the siege of the city, along with events in the battle, to 
understand how the siege was made possible and what challenges the AFP faced in 
countering ISIS’ occupation of the city.  
D. FINDINGS 
This thesis finds that the emergence of ISIS in Mindanao was deeply rooted in the 
historical development of the Philippines. The grievances in Mindanao were not new, but 
ISIS was able to capitalize on these grievances and use them for its own purposes. 
Furthermore, ISIS formed alliances with different insurgent groups representing the 
Muslim populace, groups that all had combat experience and seasoned fighters. The 
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Islamic State leveraged these preexisting groups to gain a foothold in the region. Perhaps 
most important for Islamist insurgent groups in the region, ISIS was able to shore up 
groups that had historical differences and unite these groups under its banner. Although 
groups in Mindanao were established and seasoned, ISIS brought important resources 
such as foreign fighters, financing, and social media platforms to the Marawi fight.  
Furthermore, the Siege of Marawi offers wider implications for governments and 
regions fighting ISIS. Though the AFP had fought these insurgent groups in the past, the 
combination of greater resources, new TTPs, and foreign fighters engaging in urban 
combat, forced the AFP to develop new TTPs of its own to win the battle. Ultimately, the 
AFP was successful in ending the siege. However, they were unable to eradicate the 
groups responsible for the devastation of the battle, which could be a source for eventual 
strategic defeat.  
E. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS  
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II investigates the history of 
Mindanao, particularly stressing the core grievances that led to the formation of 
numerous insurgent groups opposed to the government and the specific insurgent groups 
formed with the goal of compelling greater autonomy or independence in the region. 
Chapter III highlights the near-term conditions that allowed for ISIS to emerge and take 
root in Mindanao. The chapter also uses visual analytics to show where key groups that 
pledged allegiance to ISIS operated in Mindanao, and how their alliance with ISIS 
allowed otherwise rival groups to work together. Chapter IV provides an overview of the 
Siege of Marawi and analyzes how the different groups operated under the banner of IS-
P, using visual analytics. The chapter also describes new TTPs that ISIS brought to the 
region and that allowed groups to successfully engage in urban combat against the AFP. 





II. OVERVIEW OF MINDANAO CONFLICTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of ISIS in the Philippines did not occur overnight, nor is this the 
first incident of Islamically motivated insurgency in the southern Philippines. Rather, the 
rise of ISIS in the Philippines was the result of Filipino Muslims’ struggle for self-
determination that is as old as the history of the Philippine nation itself. One cannot fully 
understand the ISIS problem in the Philippines without first studying the history of 
Mindanao and its people. This chapter provides a brief overview of Mindanao through 
four different periods: the pre-colonial, pre-Hispanic period (before 1565); the Spanish 
colonization period (1565–1898); the time of American Occupation (1898–1946); and 
Post-Independence (1946–present). As will be described, although each period helped 
foster the archipelago into a “developed” nation-state, it also shaped grievances that 
continue to threaten the integrity of the Philippine state and the security of the inhabitants 
for whom the state was intended. The Islamic State capitalized on these grievances for its 
own gains. 
B. PRE-HISPANIC PERIOD (BEFORE 1565) 
Prior to the Spaniards’ arrival in what would later be known as the Philippines, 
the archipelago was not unified, but rather dispersed into several polities. The inhabitants 
on the different islands were organized into barangays, usually a kinship group headed 
by a datu, or chief.6 Since the barangays were many and spread across different islands, 
the people spoke different languages and dialects, in addition to practicing different 
customs and beliefs. Essentially, each barangay was autonomous from the others. 
In 1380, Sheik Karim ul-Makhdum introduced Islam in what is now the province 
of Tawi-Tawi, the southernmost cluster of islands closest to Malaysia and Mindanao.7 
Figure 1 shows a map of Mindanao. By 1500, there were Islamic communities in Sulu 
                                                 
6 Ronald E Dolan, Philippines: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1939), 5, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/92039812/. 




and Mindanao, with sultanates in Jolo, Maguindanao, and Sulu.8 Rizal G. Buendia claims 
that by that time, sultanates were also founded in Jolo, Maguindanao and Sulu.9 Islam 
expanded to Luzon by 1565.10 
 
Figure 1.  Map of Mindanao.11 
In his research on Muslim insurgency in the Philippines, Alan Luga claims that 
Islam provided a religious bond that tied the diverse tribal groups in the region, and 
created a new and distinctive Muslim ethnic identity.12 He adds, 
                                                 
8 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern 
Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2002), 186. 
9 Rizal G. Buendia, “The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines Unresolved National Question 
or Question of Governance?,” Asian Journal of Political Science 13, no. 1 (June 1, 2005): 110–11, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370508434252. 
10 Dolan, Philippines, 5. 
11 “Philippines: National Reference Map - Mindanao (21 September 2006),” ReliefWeb, September 
21, 2006, https://reliefweb.int/map/philippines/philippines-national-reference-map-mindanao-21-
september-2006. 
12 Alan Luga, “Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College, 2002), 15. 
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Islam emerged as the rallying religious, political, and historical force that 
enabled the Muslims to resist the onslaught of Spanish colonization and 
later American imperialism. Islam and its survival is still the underlying 
factor for the animosity between Muslim and Christian Filipinos.13 
The arrival of Islam to the region, therefore, was a major turning point for 
unifying otherwise disparate groups. 
C. SPANISH COLONIZATION (1565–1898) 
In 1521 the Portuguese explorer, Ferdinand Magellan, landed on the islands in the 
Visayas, claimed the archipelago for Spain, and began converting the inhabitants to 
Christianity. Local Muslim chieftain Lapu-lapu killed Magellan that same year during the 
Battle of Mactan.14 Despite his defeat, Spain later sent five additional expeditions to the 
Philippines. In 1565, the fifth expedition, under the command of Miguel Lopez de 
Legazpi, established the first enduring Spanish settlement in the Visayas and began to 
colonize the entire archipelago.15  
As previously mentioned, by this time, Islam was well-established in Mindanao 
and was expanding to the northern islands.16 Buendia asserts that this expansion is 
significant because “this signifies the rising influence of Islam in the country that could 
transform the entire archipelago into a Muslim nation similar to its neighbouring 
countries.”17  
From the Visayas, where the Spaniards were able to secure a foothold, they 
subdued the northern island of Luzon, converted the inhabitants (whom they called Indio, 
meaning “native”) to Roman Catholicism and established a seat of government in 
                                                 
13 Luga, “Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao,”15. 
14 "Ferdinand Magellan," New World Encyclopedia, accessed May 9, 2018, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Ferdinand_Magellan. 
15 “Miguel López de Legazpi,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed March 28, 2018, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Miguel-Lopez-de-Legazpi#ref272626. 
16 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 186. 
17 Buendia, “The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines," 111. 
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Manila.18 Muslims in the south, however, fiercely resisted Spain’s attempts to expand 
their conquest into Mindanao. Buendia notes that the Spaniards referred to their Muslim 
opposition as Moros, “alluding to the Muslim Moorish occupation of the Iberian 
Peninsula in the northern coast of the African continent in 711 A.D.”19 
Confrontations between the Spaniards and Muslims led to what is known as the 
Moro Wars of 1569.20 Peter G. Gowing, scholar of Muslim history in Mindanao, asserts 
that, for the Spaniards, these wars of attrition were waged primarily to curb piratical 
incursions of sultans and their followers, and to attain glory for Spain and Christianity.21 
For the Muslims, on the other hand, these wars were a defensive jihad waged to preserve 
the Islamic faith and freedom, and ultimately to avoid what they perceived as foreign 
occupation.22 Gowing further notes that, during these wars, the Spaniards adopted a 
policy of depopulation by burning settlements, plantations, fields, and orchards, coupled 
with the enslavement of Muslims in the region.23 The Moro Wars lasted until 1762, when 
the British invaded the Philippines during their Seven Years’ War.24 Hostilities again 
erupted following the departure of the British in 1764, lasting until 1898 when the United 
States arrived in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War.25  
For 329 years, Muslims successfully defended their Islamic faith and freedom 
from the Spaniards. When the Spaniards lost the Philippines in 1898, they left behind a 
divided Christian and Muslim population. The estrangement between the two groups, 
combined with Muslim animosity toward the growing authority of Manila, intensified 
                                                 
18 Salvatore Schiavo-Campo and Mary Judd, “The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs, 
and Potential Peace Dividend,” World Bank Social Development Papers, Paper No. 24 (February 2005): 1, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1111996036679/20482477/WP24_Web.pdf. 
19 Buendia, “The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines,” 110. 
20 Larry Batalla, “Countering the ISIS Threat to the Philippines: Working with Partners or Acting 
Alone?” (Fort McNair, Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2017), 16. 
21 Peter G. Gowing and Robert Day McAmis, The Muslim Filipinos (Manila, Philippines: Solidaridad 
Pub House, 1974), 7. 
22 Gowing and McAmis, The Muslim Filipinos, 7. 
23 Gowing and McAmis, The Muslim Filipinos, 8. 
24 Batalla, “Countering the ISIS Threat to the Philippines,” 16. 




even more during the succeeding periods in Philippine history beginning with the 
American occupation of the Philippines.  
D. AMERICAN OCCUPATION (1898–1946) 
The Treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898, ended the Spanish-American 
War. One result was that control of the Philippines passed from Spain to the United 
States. However, Nestor Ganancial argues in his anthropological research about Muslims 
in Mindanao that “the Moros claim they are not Filipinos because they were never 
conquered by Spain.”26 Alunan Glang, a Muslim scholar, argues that the Moros’ separate 
status from the Philippines was evident when Filipino General Emilio Aguinaldo, who 
had fought against the Spaniards and later the Americans, tried to “negotiate with the 
Moros of Sulu and Mindanao to establish national solidarity on the basis of a real 
federation with absolute respect for their beliefs and traditions.”27 
On May 19, 1899, the United States occupied and governed Mindanao and Sulu.28 
The Bates Agreement, forged between Brigadier General John C. Bates and Sulu Sultan 
Jamalul Kiram II, along with unwritten agreements made with the other Moro chiefs in 
Mindanao, solidified the United States’ administration of the southern islands.29 Through 
these agreements, the Moros acknowledged American sovereignty and the Americans 
acknowledged the Sultan of Sulu’s authority, as well as the duty to defend the Moros 
from foreign aggression. Additionally, the United States agreed not to interfere with the 
Moro traditional way of life, including its religion, governance, and intra-Moro affairs.30 
For the United States, the agreements prevented the Moros from joining the conflict in 
the northern Philippines as well as avoided a separate Moro conflict in the south. For the 
                                                 
26 Nelson Sixto H. Ganancial, “The Underdevelopment of the Moroland: A Case Study in 
Anthropology of Development,” Scribd. August 8, 2010, 2, 
https://www.scribd.com/document/35550213/Underdevelopment-of-the-Moroland. 
27 Alunan C. Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration (Quezon City, Philippines: R.P. Garcia 
Publishing, 1969), 10. 
28 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 213. 
29 Gowing and McAmis, The Muslim Filipinos, 34. 




Muslims, the United States protected both Islam and its tradition from Christian Filipinos, 
and permitted Muslims to govern themselves based on shariah law and the datu system. 
Robert A. Fulton, author of Moroland: The History of Uncle Sam and the Moros, argues 
that the Bates agreement not only kept the Moros on the sidelines during the Philippine-
American War, it also allowed the Moros to assist the Americans in decisively defeating 
Christian insurrectos in northern Mindanao.31  
On July 1, 1902, at the end of the Philippine-American War, President Theodore 
Roosevelt signed into law the Philippine Bill, also known as the Cooper Act.32 This bill 
paved the way for the creation of a civil government in the Philippines and the eventual 
establishment of the Philippine Assembly. With this act and the termination of conflict in 
central and northern Philippines, the United States nullified the Bates agreement, which 
abolished the parallel government of the Sultanate in the southern Philippines, made 
slavery illegal and protected citizens of the southern Philippines who were formerly the 
subjects of the datus.33  
In 1903, the U.S. government opted to bring the citizens of the southern 
Philippines under their direct rule. The American administration placed the Moro 
Province under a military governor stationed in Zamboanga City. This period accelerated 
the development of Mindanao as Wan Kadir bin Che Man, a Thai-Malay scholar who has 
conducted extensive fieldwork in the Philippines, notes,  
As part of the programme to “develop,” “civilize” and “educate” [the 
Moros], the American system of government and concepts of justice were 
introduced. Well-ordered provincial and district governments were 
organized. Schools and hospitals on the Western model were built. 
Agriculture and commerce were expanded. Certain practices of the Moros, 
such as slavery, were made illegal. Furthermore, Filipino Christians from 
the northern provinces were encouraged to migrate to Moroland.34 
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The Christian migration, coupled with the policy of direct rule, contributed to the 
animosity between Christians and Muslims in the south, in addition to weakening the 
authority and position of the Muslim leadership.35 Gowing argues that “the American 
policy of direct rule and attempts to implement the mandate struck at the authority and 
prestige of the Muslim chiefs and, to some extent unwittingly, at the religion and attitudes 
of all Muslim Filipinos.”36 He adds that “the American administrators of the Moro 
Province were either unaware of, or chose to completely ignore, the fact that Muslim 
Filipinos saw no separation whatever (sic) between the sacred and the secular.”37 The 
American policy, Gowing continues, “disrupted the socio-political structure and customs 
by which the Moros had lived for centuries.”38 Thus, the Muslims resented mandates 
promulgated in Mindanao, such as the parceling of lands to the Christians settlers, 
licensing of foreign vessels to fish in the Moroland waters, and the establishment of local 
governments, which deprived them of their primary source of living and altered their 
traditional practice of owning lands.39  
Moshe Yegar writes that “General Leonard Wood, the military-governor of the 
Moro province from 1903–1906, mounted a campaign against Muslims who did not 
accept American law, and thousands were killed in the fighting.”40 He adds that 
“ultimately (in 1914), after suffering from heavy losses, the Muslims realized that 
continued fighting in the face of the modern weapons held by the Americans could only 
mean the disappearance of the Muslim.”41 In August 1916, President Woodrow Wilson 
signed Public Act No. 240, the Jones Law, which granted the Philippine Legislature 
parliamentary control over Mindanao and Sulu.42 In February 1920, the Department of 
Mindanao and Sulu was abolished, marking the end of the American administration in the 
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region. Through the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, Filipino Christians took control of 
the southern islands.43 
Bin Che Man claims that despite perceived U.S. transgressions the Moros 
preferred to be governed by the Americans rather than by Filipinos.44 Additionally, he 
notes that the Moros suspected the Filipino Christians of threatening to eliminate their 
religion and steal their land.45 Bin Che Man further narrates that “the Muslim expressed 
their discontent through armed resistance.”46  
Early in 1921, Sulu’s Moro leaders asked President Woodrow Wilson to treat 
their province as an independent entity; in 1924, they asked Congress to designate Sulu 
and Mindanao a U.S. territory.47 These efforts failed and in May 1934, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act, which established a Filipino-run 
Commonwealth spanning the entire Philippine archipelago, to include the southern 
islands.48 
Bin Che Man argues that “the Commonwealth regime markedly reduced social 
and economic programmes specially designed for the Moros.”49 This pattern was 
especially apparent in the government’s handling of several important decisions. In 1934, 
as the delegates to the Constitutional Convention set to draft the Philippine Constitution, 
only four of the 202 delegates originated from Mindanao.50 During a nationwide election 
for the 98-member National Assembly, only two members were Moros.51 Nearly all 
government appointees at the time were Christians. The Commonwealth government 
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promoted the migration of Filipino Christians to Mindanao, ended the official recognition 
of the Moro’s traditional social system, imposed compulsory military training in a 
“Christian” army, and interfered with religious traditions, such as plural marriages.52  
Moros resorted to armed struggle against the government, primarily in the area of 
Lanao, beginning in 1936.53 This conflict ceased during the Japanese occupation in 1941 
when the Muslims of the southern Philippines supported the government’s anti-Japanese 
war efforts.54  
E. POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD (1946–PRESENT) 
Following World War II, the Philippines gained its independence from the United 
States on July 4, 1946. Still, Bin Che Man argues that many Muslims continued to assert 
their identity as distinct from Filipinos.55 Luga adds that the Muslims fostered a 
deepening sense of deprivation from the increasing flow of Christian settlers to Mindanao 
that gradually displaced them from their ancestral areas and reduced them to a minority in 
their own lands.56 The agricultural competition that the government had created in the 
Muslim indigenous territories further propelled the unrest between Christian settlers and 
Muslims over land ownership.57 The Christian settlers organized community self-defense 
units called Ilaga, or rats.58 By the 1960s, armed clashes between the Ilaga on one side 
and Black Shirts in Central Mindanao and the Barracudas of Lanao on the opposing side 
escalated in Mindanao.59 Gowing argues that the Muslims accused the government forces 
of being allies of the Ilagas.60 
                                                 
52 Luga, “Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao,” 30. 
53 Bin Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 55. 
54 Bin Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 56. 
55 Bin Che Man, Muslim Separatism, 56. 
56 Luga, “Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao,” 31–32. 
57 Luga, “Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao,” 32. 
58 Gowing and McAmis, The Muslim Filipinos, 46. 
59 Luga, “Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao,” 32. 
60 Gowing and McAmis, The Muslim Filipinos, 47. 
 
 14 
In addition, the post-war period saw the resurgence of Islam in the Muslim world 
and the deepening sense of group consciousness among the Islamic population. 
According to Bin Che Man, Muslim scholars from across the world, particularly Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya, went to the Philippines in the 1950s to strengthen 
commitment to Islam in the southern Philippines.61 Foreign Islamic institutions and 
universities provided scholarships to young Moros, while other organizations invited the 
Moro leaders to host seminars and conferences of various Muslim bodies.62 This 
international influence strengthened the Moro nationalism and solidarity. Bin Che Man 
writes:  
The revitalization of Islam has helped not only to heighten the religious 
solidarity of the Moros but also to sharpen the sense of “difference” 
between them and Christian Filipinos. Moros prefer to be called “Muslim” 
to emphasize their belonging to a different religion. They refer to the 
Manila government as “the Christian government” to which no true 
Muslim owes allegiance.63 
Once again, therefore, Islam provided a vehicle through which to consolidate and 
differentiate identity from the rest of the Philippines.  
The conflict in Mindanao gave rise to a full-blown separatist movement in 1968 
when the AFP executed 27 Muslim Army recruits in what is now referred to as the 
Jabidah Massacre.64 These recruits were part of a larger force trained by the government 
in preparation for “Operation Merdeka,” a top-secret plan to invade and reclaim the 
territory of Sabah from Malaysia during the Marcos Presidential Administration.65 The 
incident resulted to two political consequences: the formation of Muslim Independence 
Movement (MIM) in 1968 under Datu Udtog Matalam, and an inflamed Philippine 
relationship with Malaysia. Che Man argues that the Malaysian government of Tunku 
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Abdul Rahman provided support, training, and weapons to MIM followers.66 When Datu 
Matalam surrendered to the government in 1972, the MIM disintegrated.  
In 1970, then Congressman Rachid Lucman formed the Bangsa Moro Liberation 
Organization, which later became Bangsa Muslimin Islamic Liberation Organization 
(BMILO).67 Buendia describes how several of the BMILO members possessed military 
training from Sabah, Malaysia, with Hashim Salamat and Nur Misuari as among the first 
batch of trainees.68 In the early 1970s, the key leaders of BMILO negotiated with 
President Marcos for Mindanao’s political autonomy, signaling the end of the 
organization.  
F. MAJOR REBEL GROUPS 
Instead of ending the Moro conflict, the collapse of BMILO unsealed a new era of 
intensified Muslim resistance. From 1972 onward, many anti-government groups have 
emerged with varying ideologies and goals, which has helped generate the complex 
conditions seen today.  
1. Moro National Liberation Front  
In 1972, against the backdrop of the Jabidah Massacre, the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) was founded in Pulau, Malaysia, with the demand for better 
treatment of the Moro people and their land, an end to land confiscation, and a quest for 
regional independence. Nur Misuari was the initial chairman.69 Unlike separatist groups 
established earlier, the MNLF proved to be the best organized and most formidable. It 
had a parallel political structure that consisted of a central committee, political bureau, a 
propaganda and intelligence bureau, provincial and community committees, along with 
military structures that included the Bangsa Moro Army and Home Defense units.70 Che 
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Man notes that, aside from Malaysia, the MNLF received external financial support from 
Libya (the largest donor), the Islamic Solidarity Fund, and several predominantly Muslim 
countries in the form of zakat.71  
President Marcos’ declaration of martial law in September 1972, and the 
subsequent attempt at nationwide disarmament, drew more Muslims to join the 
organization in opposition of the government.72 From 1972 to 1976, fierce clashes 
between the AFP and the MNLF ensued, resulting in approximately 100,000 lives lost 
and over half a million civilians displaced.73  
On December 23, 1976, the MNLF and the Philippine government signed the 
Tripoli Agreement, which established an autonomous region composed of the provinces 
of Basilan, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North 
Cotabato, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Zamboanga del 
Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.74 However, only three provinces voted to ratify the 
agreement largely due to the Christian majority in the other ten provinces.75 
Subsequently, Misuari abandoned the talks, renewed his call for full independence, and 
returned to guerilla warfare.76  
On September 2, 1996, the MNLF and the Philippine government signed the 1996 
Government of the Philippines-MNLF Peace Agreement, which led to the election of Nur 
Misuari, who ran unopposed, as Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao, or ARMM. Misuari, however, was later accused of corruption and 
mismanagement. His key followers in the MNLF and ARMM, known as the “Council of 
15,” unseated him as MNLF Chairman, and gave him the symbolic title of “Chairman 
Emeritus,” effectively rendering him powerless. About to forfeit his position as ARMM 
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governor, Misuari prompted his followers to attack Cabatangan compound in Zamboanga 
on November 27, 2001, which left 25 guerrillas, one soldier, and one civilian dead along 
with a number of others wounded.77 He escaped to Malaysia but was later extradited back 
to the Philippines. The Misuari-led MNLF faction, called Rogue MNLF (RMNLF), 
continued its armed rebellion. On September 9, 2013, the RMNLF attacked Zamboanga 
in an attempt to thwart a government peace talk with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 
or MILF, an MNLF breakaway group.  
2. Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
When Nur Misuari signed the Tripoli Agreement with President Marcos in 1976, 
his Vice Chairman, Hashim Salamat, broke away and formed a faction named New 
MNLF composed mainly of fighters from central Mindanao: Maguindanaons, 
Maranaoans, and Iranuns.78 Salamat rejected the idea of ARMM, choosing instead to 
fight for an independent “Moro Islamic state” that would consist of provinces of ARMM 
along with Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, 
Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Palawan.79  
In March 1984, Salamat officially declared his group a separate organization 
called Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). He defined the MILF’s ultimate objective 
as “building a Muslim community or Ummah in the Bangsamoro which would have a 
genuine Islamic system of government and a real Islamic way of life.”80 Nathan Gilbert 
Quimpo, a social scientist who has authored numerous books and journal articles focused 
on Muslims in Mindanao, asserts that the MILF’s active involvement in the anti-Soviet 
coalition during the Soviet-Afghan War led to financial support from Osama bin Laden 
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and Middle Eastern countries as well as the training of hundreds of Moro mujahideen in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.81  
By the mid-1990s, the MILF became the Philippines’ largest Moro rebel group 
and its armed wing, Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, reached upwards of 15,000 
fighters.82 The group also allied with ASG, Al Qaeda (AQ), and JI. The MILF established 
a parallel government within its controlled area (Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte, North 
Cotabato, and Basilan) covering roughly 10 percent of Mindanao.83 When the MILF 
invaded Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, President Joseph Estrada ordered an “all-out war” 
on March 21, 2000. The conflict ended with the capture of Camp Abubakar, MILF’s 
headquarters.  
On January 20, 2001, President Estrada left office in the midst of impeachment 
proceedings, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed the presidency. Arroyo negotiated 
with the MILF and proposed the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
(MOA-AD), which established a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), described as a 
“state within a state” in an “associative relationship” with the Philippines.84 Deemed 
unconstitutional by the Philippine Supreme Court, President Arroyo’s successor, 
President Benigno Aquino III, made another proposal called the Bangsamoro Basic Law. 
When this law was on the cusp of ratification, the Special Action Force (SAF) of the 
Philippine National Police (PNP) clashed with the forces of MILF and BIFF at 
Mamasapano, Maguindanao on January 25, 2015. Forty-four SAF operatives served a 
warrant for the arrest of Malaysian JI terrorist and bomb-maker Zulkifli Abdir, also 
known as Marwan, who was in hiding within MILF territory. Marwan was a notorious 
militant who was also listed as one of the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists. The clash left 
the 44 SAF operatives dead, along with 18 MILF fighters and Marwan. The Bangsamoro 
Basic Law was nullified immediately after the bloodshed.  
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3. Abu Sayyaf Group  
In 1991, Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani founded the ASG, whose objective is to 
create “an Islamic state  not autonomy, not independence, not a revolution.”85 Janjalani 
studied in Libya and Saudi Arabia from 1980 to 1984 under the scholarship of a 
conservative Islamic organization, Al Islamic Tabligh.86 Although originally a member of 
the MNLF, he was sent to Afghanistan to fight alongside the International Islamic 
Brigade during the Soviet-Afghan War. Rommel Banlaoi, Chairman of the Board of the 
Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, claims that while in 
Peshawar, Pakistan, Janjalani met Osama bin Laden and established close ties with AQ.87  
Upon his return to the Philippines in 1990, Janjalani broke away from the MNLF 
following the organization’s decision to negotiate with the government. He then built 
ASG with disgruntled members of MNLF and MILF. Since its founding, ASG has 
perpetrated a number of terrorist attacks, including bombings of civil and military 
establishments, airports, wharves, and ferries. The group was responsible for the bombing 
of the Christian missionary ship, M/V Doulos, while docked on Zamboanga City in 
August 1991 that left two dead; Davao Airport on March 4, 2003, killing 21 people; M/V 
Super Ferry 14 on February 27, 2004, killing 94 people and leaving 24 others missing; 
and the attacks on several establishments in General Santos, Makati City, and Davao City 
on February 14, 2005.88 On April 3, 1993, ASG also raided Ipil City in Zamboanga del 
Sur where they killed more than 50 civilians, injured close to 50, and robbed banks of 
approximately Php1B ($25 million).89 The group is also known for their terror tactics 
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including kidnappings for ransom, assassinations, beheadings, and extortion.90 ASG 
continues to be the most violent and notorious group in the Philippines.  
In a CRS Report for Congress, Specialist in Asian Affairs Larry Niksch wrote that 
ASG received support and funding from AQ in the early 1990s.91 Furthermore, Banlaoi 
claims that Ramzi Yousef, one of the key perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing and the 1994 Philippine Airlines flight 434 bombing, operated in Basilan and 
trained Abu Sayyaf fighters.92 Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, a wealthy businessman and 
brother-in-law of bin Laden, strengthened further the affiliation through financial and 
logistic support to ASG.93 The extent of the relationship between AQ and ASG after the 
mid-1990s remains unclear. It is also unknown whether the ASG Hapilon faction that 
pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014 affected the overall relationship of ASG and AQ.  
4. Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters  
The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, or BIFF, is a splinter group of the 
MILF. Ameril Umbra Kato founded the group in December 2010 when the MILF 
adopted the government’s proposal of autonomy instead of independence.94 Kato, who 
embraces an extreme version of Islam, studied in Saudi Arabia as a member of MNLF 
prior to joining the MILF. 
BIFF operates in the provinces of Maguindanao and Cotabato with a goal of 
complete independence as opposed to autonomy.95 The group has carried out attacks 
                                                 
90 “Security Council Committee Pursuant To Resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) 
Concerning ISIL (DA’ESH) AL-QAIDA and Associated Individuals Groups Undertakings and Entities,” 
United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, last modified January 18, 2018. 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/abu-sayyaf-group. 
91 Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report No. 
RL31265 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 
http://www.au.af.mil/AU/AWC/AWCGATE/crs/rl31265.pdf. 
92 Banlaoi, “Radical Muslim Terrorism,” 207. 
93 “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, accessed March 8, 
2018, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152#note79. 
94 “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, 
accessed August 27, 2015, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/601?highlight=ASG. 
95 “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University.  
 
 21 
against government forces in order to undermine peace talks between MILF and the 
Philippine government and against the MILF’s armed wing over control of territory in 
Maguindanao.96 BIFF is most notorious for its operation that resulted in the death of 44 
Special Action Force personnel from the PNP in January 25, 2015, as previously 
mentioned. The group declared its allegiance to ISIS in a YouTube video in 2014.97 
5. Maute Group 
The Maute Group, also known as the Islamic State of Lanao, was founded by the 
Omar and Abdullah Maute. The brothers studied at Al Azhar University in Cairo, and in 
Jordan, where they became fluent in Arabic.98 They are cousins of the second wife of 
Alim Abdulaziz Mimbantas, the MILF Vice Chairman for Military Affairs.99 Military 
intelligence links the Maute brothers to well-known militantsIndonesian Ustadz Sanusi 
and the Malaysian bomb maker Marwan, who was killed in 2015.100 Articulate, educated, 
and idealistic, the brothers had been very active online and on social media, particularly 
on Youtube.101 Regional security expert Sidney Jones argued that the group is believed to 
be the “smartest, best educated and most sophisticated members of all of the pro-ISIS 
groups in the Philippines.”102 The group is composed mostly of young students, 
professionals, and disgruntled MILF and MNLF members. According to Banlaoi, the 
group is allied with factions of the ASG and BIFF, along with remnants of AKP and 
Khilafa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM).103 (See the following subsection, “Other Rebel 
Groups.”) 
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On May 23, 2017, the combined forces of the Maute Group and the Isnilon 
Hapilon faction of ASG laid siege to Marawi City when the government forces attempted 
to arrest Hapilon, the leader of ASG operating in Basilan Province. At the time of the 
attack, the Maute Group and Hapilon’s Abu Sayyaf faction had pledged their allegiance 
to ISIS, and Hapilon was designated as the Emir of all Islamic State forces in the 
Philippines.104 
6. Other Rebel Groups 
Though the scope of this thesis is focused on ISIS-affiliated groups in the 
southern Philippines, several other groups exist that are radical in nature and must be 
highlighted to further illuminate the complexity of the region. 
Al Khobar (AK) is a MILF splinter group with an allegiance to ASG. Terrorism 
Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC) reports that “key members come from 
MILF’s Special Operations Group (MILF-SOG) known for extorting bus companies and 
working with JI on a series of bombings in Manila (Rizal Day Bombings).”105  
Ansar al-Khilafah Philippines, or AKP, is a jihadist group established in 2013 by 
a combination of local and foreign terrorists. The AKP is a merged splinter group of the 
MILF, Southeast Asia jihadist network, and local gangs based in southern Mindanao.106 
The group swore allegiance to ISIS in August 2014, supporting the goal to establish an 
Islamic caliphate through violent jihad and implementation of Sharia Law. The group 
sought to attain this objective by securing external support and recruiting from other 
terrorist groups in Mindanao.107 
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Jemaah Islamiyah Philippines (JI-P) is the local chapter of the wider JI, an AQ-
linked terrorist group responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2003 bombing of the 
Marriot Hotel and Australian Embassy in Jakarta. The group’s objective is to establish an 
Islamic State in the Philippines, part of the larger international JI mission of establishing 
“a pan-Islamic republic incorporating Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand and 
southern Philippines.”108 
Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM) is another group that pursues for an 
independent religious state in Mindanao. Though it is said to be founded by an AQ-linked 
Islamist and an Afghan-trained Islamic cleric, Ustadz Humam Abdul Najid (alias Wai), 
TRAC reports that it was actually founded by the Maute brothers, Abdullah and Omar.109 
The KIM was originally an “umbrella organization” of local operatives of JI, BIFF, and 
ASG.110 
The Communist Party of the PhilippinesNew People’s ArmyNational 
Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF), which is the armed wing of the Communist Party of 
the Philippines, Marxist-Leninist (CPP-ML), was founded by Jose Maria Sison in 
1969.111 The group’s objective is to overthrow the Philippine government and establish a 
national democratic state through the employment of guerrilla warfare in a protracted 
war. Until 1992, the Philippine government treated the NPA and CPP as illicit 
organizations. The government and the NPA attempted peace negotiations that failed, and 
the group was later designated a terrorist organization in 2017.112 Though its members 
were mostly Christians, the NPA formed a tactical alliance with the MILF to oppose the 
central government and press for independence.113 Military intelligence also reports that 
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the NPA has links to JI and AQ.114 Table 1 summarizes the different militant groups 
operating in Mindanao. 
Table 1.   Key Militant Groups in Mindanao. 
Threat 
Group 
Leader Pledge to 
ISIS 
Objective 
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The conflict in Mindanao is deeply rooted in the historical development of the 
Philippines. The Muslims’ struggle for self-determination, which began during the 
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colonial period, is still prominent almost 500 years later. Different organizations 
representing the Muslim populace have emerged to find solutions to the Moro problem; 
however, efforts to end the conflict and reach a compromise with the government have 
resulted in splinter groups and new factions. Some of these groups, in turn, have aligned 
with foreign entities, including AQ and ISIS, adding layers of complexity to the problem. 
The next chapter looks at the conditions that allowed the merger of BIFF, ASG, AKP, 








III. THE RISE OF ISIS IN THE PHILIPPINES AND HOW IS-P IS 
CONNECTED 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 Several events created the conditions for IS-P to emerge in Mindanao, including 
the success of ISIS in declaring the caliphate in Syria; the stalled peace negotiations in 
the Philippines following the Mamasapano Massacre; newly elected President Rodrigo 
Duterte’s shift from a focus on Islamist separatist groups in Mindanao to countering the 
drug trade in Luzon; and the security vacuum left in the region following the dissolution 
of the Joint Special Operations Task ForcePhilippines (JSOTF-P) in 2015. These 
conditions created a window of opportunity for already established Islamist groups to 
pledge the bayat—the oath of loyalty—to ISIS, and for ISIS to gain a foothold in the 
region.  
This chapter begins by describing how the combination of these four conditions 
created an opportunity for Islamist groups in the region to align with ISIS, and for the 
emergence of IS-P in Mindanao. The chapter then deploys visual analytics to demonstrate 
which terrorist groups joined ISIS, how they aligned to form IS-P, and where they are 
known to operate within Mindanao.  
This investigation finds that the aforementioned conditions coupled with the 
opportunity to align with ISIS enabled once-rival groups in Mindanao to set aside 
longstanding differences and unite to become IS-P. In other words, ISIS created an 
overarching framework that allowed groups historically at odds to work together. This 
newly formed alliance under the banner of ISIS, which was further facilitated through 
social relationships and shared operational areas, allowed for these groups to combine 
their skills and fighters to mount an aggressive offensive in Marawi in 2017 that caught 
Philippine security forces off guard and required considerable effort to put down. 
B. THE RISE OF ISIS IN MINDANAO  
The rapid expansion of ISIS in Syria and its successful capture of major cities in 
Iraq, followed by Al Baghdadi’s declaration of the caliphate in 2014, became important 
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events for Islamist groups around the globe, including in Mindanao. As early as 2014, 
Islamist groups in Mindanao began pledging the bayat to ISIS. U.S. Army Colonel Dave 
Maxwell, a former commander of JSOTF-P, argues that these groups were drawn to ISIS’ 
ideology to “enhance their legitimacy and gain recruits, resources, and respect.”116 
Specifically, he argues, these groups were attracted to the social media recognition, 
radical ideology, and global attention that ISIS maintained. ISIS reciprocated this 
attraction to “keep its ideology alive by spreading to other countries where it could 
capitalize on conditions of political resistance that weaken governments and provide safe 
havens for training, recruiting, and eventual resurrection of its quest for the Caliphate.”117 
The October 25, 2016 report on Mindanao by the Institute for Policy Analysis and 
Conflict echo these comments. It describes this popular new movement, the power of 
ISIS ideology, and the “appeal of the ISIS brand” to the pre-existing groups operating in 
Mindanao:  
Support for ISIS in Mindanao has meant more than a repackaging of old 
kidnapping-for-ransom groups. It has facilitated cooperation across clan 
and ethnic lines, widened the extremist recruitment pool to include 
computer-savvy university students and opened new international 
communication and possibly funding channels. It means that more deadly 
violence in the Philippines involving alliances of pro-ISIS groups is a 
matter of when, not if.118 
Perhaps the most significant group to pledge the bayat in the summer of 2014 was 
ASG, through its leader Isnilon Hapilon. ASG’s pledge of allegiance was followed by 
BIFF in August 2014, the Maute Group in 2015, and AKP pledged in July 2016. 
Analysts, political leaders, and even former President Fidel Valdez Ramos raised 
concerns over the emerging threat posed by this pledge of allegiance.119 On August 19, 
2014, Ramos, who had also served in the Philippine Constabulary in Mindanao, cited an 
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intelligence report that at least 100 Filipino Muslims had already infiltrated into Iraq to 
undergo training so they could return to the Philippines as jihadists.120 The Philippine 
Inquirer reported on August 25, 2014, that then Mayor of Davao, Rodrigo Duterte, 
claimed that ISIS had recruited several Davao residents.121  
Nonetheless, then President Aquino downplayed the threat posed by the extremist 
group, claiming that “it is [just] an attempt to enhance their own status, especially for 
those that are increasingly being marginalized.”122 Lt. Gen. Rustico O. Guerrero also 
discounted the group’s pledges to ISIS, stating that there was no “direct linkage” between 
the groups and ISIS.123 The Philippine government continued to underestimate ASG, and 
President Aquino insisted that, up until April 2016, there was no credible ISIS terror 
threat in the Philippines.124 
The second condition that helped fuel the rise of ISIS in the Philippines occurred 
in 2015, when the Philippine government suspended the deliberation of Bangsamoro 
Basic Law (BBL). The BBL was the product of a peace treaty forged between the 
Philippine government and MILF during the incumbency of President Benigno Aquino 
III in October 2012.125 President Aquino proposed the BBL to the Philippine Congress in 
September 2014 to be the basic law of the new Bangsamoro (Moro state), which would 
replace the ARMM.126 When approved into law, the proposed BBL would implement the 
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), which was negotiated between the 
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MILF and the Government of the Philippines.127 This peace treaty was the culmination of 
an 18-year peace negotiation between the MILF and the Government of the Philippines 
following protracted conflict that claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced 
millions of people.128  
The Philippine Congress received the proposed bill on September 10, 2014 for 
deliberation, with Senate President Franklin Drilon and House Speaker Feliciano 
Belmonte, Jr. agreeing to pass the BBL by the year’s end.129 However, on January 26, 
2015, Senator Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. suspended the deliberation following the 
Mamasapano clash a day earlier, in which Philippine forces arrested and killed a high-
ranking JI-affiliated terrorist, Zulkifli Adhir, known by his alias “Marwan.” MILF 
elements engaged government troops, which resulted in the death of 44 SAF personnel, 
18 MILF fighters, and five civilians.130 The incident created a nationwide furor that 
dominated headlines for months, and Congress ultimately suspended consideration for 
the proposed law.  
Sources suggest that the Maute Group took advantage of the suspension of the 
BBL to recruit militants. The CNN Philippines, for example, reported on March 3, 2016, 
that Colonel Roseller Murillo, commander of the 103rd Infantry Brigade operating on 
Lanao del Sur, claimed “the armed group may be using the government’s non-passage of 
BBL to encourage locals to join them.”131 The collapse of this peace agreement 
exacerbated the already fragile territorial and political climate, possibly further driving 
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militants to turn to more radical ISIS-linked organizations.132 Southeast Asian security 
expert Zachary M. Abuza argues, “it was not the spread of ISIS in Iraq and Syria that 
fueled ISIS cells in the Philippines, but the collapse of the peace process.”133 Sheena 
Greitens of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies concurs that “the collapse of the peace 
agreement and the resultant failure to create the Bangsamoro region, have contributed to 
the splintering” of MILF and breakaway groups moving toward more radical options such 
as ISIS.134 
The third factor that led to the alliance between Islamist groups in Mindanao and 
ISIS was President Duterte’s focus on his war on drugs, the cornerstone of his domestic 
policy, at the expense of countering militants in Mindanao. On his first day in office in 
2016, President Duterte “demonstrated a significant degree of political will to curb the 
proliferation of illegal drugs in the country.”135 As a result, there was a significant 
increase in the number of those who were killed in anti-illegal drugs operations. The 
government claimed that a total of 3,151 people had been killed from July 1, 2016 to June 
13, 2017,136 which is an exponential upswing from the six-month period between January 
and June 2016 when 68 people were killed in police anti-drug operations.137  
 The Economist has reported that the anti-drug campaign underscored the new 
president’s first eight months in office, and his “anti-drug crusade risks becoming a 
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distraction from the many more constructive items on his agenda.”138 While President 
Duterte was heavily consumed with Oplan Tokhang, a government initiative aimed at 
eradicating illegal drug trafficking, ISIS was gaining traction in Mindanao. Sidney Jones, 
director of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict in Jakarta, Indonesia, asserts, 
While President Rodrigo Duterte focused his energies during his first year 
in office on waging a brutal campaign against suspected drug dealers and 
users, a motley coalition supporting the Islamic State — former guerrillas, 
university students, scions of political families, Christian converts to 
Islam— grew into a fighting force with surprising staying power.139 
Similarly, Santiago J Arnaiz, a journalist with Rappler, who covered the siege of 
Marawi, observed that “the rising threat of ISIS command moving into the country 
remains largely unchecked.”140 Duterte’s war on drugs, therefore, took government 
attention away from Mindanao and the growing presence of ISIS in the region. 
Duterte’s war on drugs also came with international consequences. Thirty-nine 
countries “expressed concern over the rising number of drug-related killings” in the 
Philippines and called on the government to end and investigate these deaths.141 Former 
U.S. President Obama, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings Agnes 
Callamard, former Philippine Human Rights Commissioner and Senator Leila de Lima, 
condemned the anti-illegal drug campaign and accused President Duterte of using extra 
judicial killings to counter drug dealers.142 
Fourth, the dissolution of JSOTF-P helped contribute to the emergence of ISIS in 
Mindanao. Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines’ (OEF-P) mission officially ended 
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in March 2015. Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the U.S. government 
became concerned with the spread of AQ around the globe. A rise in terrorist activity in 
Mindanao around the same time as the 9/11 attacks prompted the Philippine government 
to accept U.S. outreach for support in reducing Islamist activism. In 2002, the United 
States established JSOTF-P to support the AFP in combating these threats. 
Approximately 1,300 U.S. forces deployed to the southern Philippines in 2002 and, 
thereafter, support averaged between 500 to 600 troops at any given time.143 JSOTF-P’s 
efforts included providing operational support and assistance to AFP operations against 
insurgent groups; helping improve the capabilities of the Philippine forces; and executing 
information operations and civil–military operations with Philippine forces.  
RAND’s 2016 comprehensive study on JSOTF-P, U.S. Special Operations Forces 
in the Philippines, 2001–2014, identified several contributions that U.S. SOF activities in 
the Philippines made to their counterinsurgency efforts. First, their presence reduced the 
transnational terrorist threat and support for terrorist groups. Second, a U.S. 
presence increased Philippine Special Forces capabilities at the tactical, operational, and 
institutional levels.144 And third, JSOTF-P effectively facilitated Philippine forces’ 
combat operations, increased the popular support for the government, and reduced safe 
havens relished by the terrorist groups.145 According to the findings in the report, ASG 
initiated attacks declined by 56 percent from 2000 to 2012, the strength of ASG 
insurgents decreased from an estimated 2,200 to 400 fighters, and popular support 
increased for government forces and decreased for ASG overall.146 With support from the 
United States, the AFP was able to improve its operations against ASG, disrupting 
operations, gaining control of significant locations, and denying the group use of various 
safe havens.147 These OEF-P efforts helped to eliminate numerous high-value targets, 
facilitators, and sympathizers. The support and safe-haven afforded to ASG and JI 
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diminished after civil-military operations, combat operations, and conflict-resolution 
activities undertaken by the Philippine government.148  
Although plans were put in place to enable a seamless transition of support from 
U.S. forces to Philippine forces, the study notes that Philippine and U.S. officials also 
expressed concern that the withdrawal of U.S. troops and resources could “lead to a 
resurgence of a renewed terrorist threat, possibly sparked by aggressive propaganda and 
recruitment by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).”149 In order to mitigate 
these risks, JSOTF-P instilled a phased and gradual downsizing of efforts before 
transitioning oversight of the mission to the U.S. Pacific Command Augmentation Team 
based out of the U.S. Embassy in February 2015.  
The RAND report further details that, at the time of the dissolution of JSOTF-P in 
2015, both the U.S. and AFP commands “characterized the transnational terrorist threat 
as reduced to a largely criminal phenomenon,” although some of the groups’ leadership 
structure remained intact.150  
Specifically, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) as a threat with potential global appeal and reach caused some 
speculation regarding the possibility of a resurgent threat of extremist 
violence in the southern Philippines. In July and August 2014, the ASG 
and BIFF (a splinter group of the MILF) both released videos declaring 
their support for ISIL, but Lt. Gen. Rustico O. Guerrero stated that there 
was no indication of a “direct linkage” between the groups and ISIL.151 
Furthermore, neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia remained a potential sanctuary 
and training grounds for remnants of the groups. Finally, the study notes that both U.S. 
and Philippine military officials advocated for “continued vigilance to guard against the 
possibility that a new ideological leader might surface to regenerate violent extremist 
organizations.”152 
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The dissolution of JSOTF-P reduced the Philippines’ access to intelligence assets, 
including Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) platforms and intelligence 
fusion departments, along with Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Civil Affairs (CA) 
support to the underdeveloped areas of Mindanao and a lessened security footprint in the 
region. The withdrawal of these assets put Philippines forces at a tactical and operational 
disadvantage for the upcoming confrontation with ISIS aligned Mindanao groups.  
In sum, ISIS’ declaration of the caliphate in Syria; the stalled peace negotiations 
in the Philippines following the Mamasapano Massacre; President Duterte’s shift from 
Islamist separatist groups to counter drug operations; and the security vacuum left when 
JSOTF-P withdrew helped pave the way for ISIS to gain a foothold in Mindanao and 
facilitated collaboration between preexisting militant groups in region.  
C. VISUAL AND RELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE GROUPS THAT 
MAKE UP IS-P 
As discussed in Chapter II, there were several known groups operating in 
Mindanao beginning around the year 2000. These groups, which had established 
leadership, built skills and accumulated materiel that became important resources for ISIS 
as it began to reach out to insurgent groups around the globe. In 2014, just after ISIS 
established the caliphate, ASG, the Maute Group, BIFF, and AKP, perhaps the most 
capable and formidable groups in Mindanao, pledged allegiance to ISIS and began to 
collaborate. These groups, which once were rivals and occasionally fought each other, 
joined forces to create IS-P. Together, these groups carried out the siege of Marawi, 
which is discussed further in Chapter IV.  
To better understand the connections formed among these groups, this section 
uses relational analysis and visual analytics to create depictions of their social network 
along with geographic visualizations to show their proximity and placement to one 
 
 36 
another, other prominent groups, and among Muslim populations.153 Drawing from data 
gathered by the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, or TRAC, and the Global 
Terrorism Database, or GTD,154 this analysis aims to better understand the geographic 
and resource benefits created by the IS-P alliance.  
The groups that made up IS-P established strongholds among Muslim populations 
in Mindanao. Figure 2, a map from Reuters, shows the four main groups that make up IS-
P and their distinct areas of operation in Mindanao, broken down by province. The Maute 
Group, shown in orange, is known to operate primarily in Lanao del Sur (LDS) province, 
the province that includes Marawi. The BIFF, shown in pink, is known to operate 
primarily in Maguindanao. AKP, shown in purple, operates primarily in Sultan Kudarat, 
and ASG, shown in blue, operations on the islands of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi Tawi.  
As described in Chapter II, these groups formed along tribal lines that are 
regularly in conflict with one another. The ASG (Basilan faction) almost entirely 
originated from the Yakan tribe, the BIFF is ethnically Maguindanaoan, while the Maute 
Group is Maranao. ISIS provided an ideological bond that allowed these diverse and 
otherwise rival tribal groups to work together against a common enemy, the Philippine 
Government. Although ASG, BIFF, Maute Group, and AKP pledged the bayat to ISIS, 
there are seven other groups that did not pledge the bayat but still operate in the southern 
Philippines, including the NPA, MNLF, MILF, Al Khobar, JI-P, KIM, and Marakat al-
Ansar.155  
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Figure 2.  The ISIS-Linked Groups and Their Territory in Mindanao.156 
Figure 3 shows 11 of the most prevalent groups displayed in a sociogram; a visual 
depiction of the groups and their connections to one another. Each labeled square, or 
node, represents one of the ISIS-linked groups, and the line connecting the nodes 
indicates a relational tie, or connection, between the groups. The relational ties depicted 
include three types of connections: collaboration ties through terrorist or insurgent 
activity, shared interests, and shared ISIS affiliation. The cluster of nodes circled 
represents the groups interconnected through their affiliation with ISIS: specifically, 
ASG, BIFF, Maute Group, and AKP.  
                                                 




This layer of connectivity demonstrates that the network of groups residing in 
Mindanao is a factor and is more complex than just the four isolated groups that pledged 
the bayat. Many of the historical events outlined in Chapter II that shaped the formation 
of individual groups also served as mechanisms for tie formation among them.  
The sociogram further depicts that these same four groups have ties to the non-
ISIS groups through facilitation-based relationships. For example, the NPA is tied to 
BIFF because they are known to have a “tactical alliance” against the Philippine 
government.157 MNLF, MILF, and ASG are also connected because they are historically 
related before breaking off to form their own factions; for example, MILF is a splinter of 
MNLF.  
 
Figure 3.  Groups Operating in Mindanao and Groups that Pledged the Bayat to 
ISIS.  
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Geographic proximity is also important to understand the ties and resources 
different groups share, including those among ISIS-linked and non-ISIS groups. The 
sociogram in Figure 4 shows the geographic proximity of the 11 groups across the 
provinces in Mindanao and includes where the groups operate, where they are known to 
gather logistics, and where they conduct training, operations, and recruitment. The 11 
groups are shown in green and the locations in Mindanao where these groups operate are 
shown in orange.  
The sociogram in Figure 4 shows the dynamic overlap of all 11 groups that 
operate in Mindanao. For instance, of the 13 locations depicted in Figure 4, 92 percent 
serve as operational areas for at least two groups, which highlights substantial, spatial 
overlap among ISIS-linked and non-ISIS linked groups. An examination of both Figures 
3 and 4 suggests that the spatial proximity of these groups increases the probability that 
two groups have social ties, which corroborates evidence that physical proximity is 
positively related to social tie formation.158 In other words, it is more likely for two 
groups that share an operational area to form a relationship with each other (e.g., tactical 
alliance) than it is for two groups who do not. One can see how groups with social ties 
(Figure 3) also often share operational areas (Figure 4), including both ISIS aligned 
groups (e.g., ASG and BIFF in Lanao del Sur and Cotabato) and combinations of ISIS 
and non-ISIS groups (e.g., ASG and Marakat al-Ansar in Sulu, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi, 
and BIFF and MILF in Lanao del Sur and Cotabato).  
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Figure 4.  Organization by Location. 
By focusing on specific locations, LDS and Cotabato City are the two most 
central areas of operation for these eleven groups. The city of Marawi is located within 
LDS and its territory is the operational base of the Maute Group, along with Lanao del 
Norte (LDN). As described in Chapter IV, the Maute Group formed the backbone of the 
offensive in the Battle of Marawi. In other words, IS-P took advantage of the Maute 
Group’s preexisting presence in the city, including its knowledge of the city, logistics 
lines, and fighters to successfully launch its offensive in 2017.   
The remaining groups operate in what are traditionally known as MILF and 
MNLF controlled areas, including Maguindanao and Sulu provinces. It is unclear from 
the data gathered whether these MILF and MNLF controlled areas have provided 
assistance to the IS-P groups, or if some of their militants hold dual membership. 
However, given that these are Muslim majority areas (see Figure 5), it is possible that IS-
P used their areas for recruiting, and possibly as a safe haven during the Battle of 
Marawi.  
All four of the IS-P groups (ASG, BIFF, Maute Group, and AKP) are also known 
to operate in the provinces in Mindanao that have the highest Muslim population. Figure 
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5 depicts the percentage of Muslims in Mindanao based on each province. The map 
illustrates the provinces with the highest Muslim population in dark red, and the lighter 
the shade of red the less dense the Muslim population. For example, the Maute Group 
operates in Lanao del Sur, which has the highest Muslim population in Mindanao, and 
Lanao del Norte. ASG operates primarily in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi Tawi, and Zamboanga 
provinces, which have the next highest Muslim populated areas in Mindanao. BIFF and 
AKP operate primarily in Maguindanao, Cotobato, Sultan Kudarat, and Sarangani 
Pronvinces, which have significantly fewer Muslims. Although the groups originate from 
different tribes, they share Islam as a common factor, and it appears that the ideology of 
ISIS united these groups beginning in 2014. Finally, these groups are geographically 
close to one another, which, once aligned under ISIS, may have allowed opportunities to 
work together and collaborate on training, operations, or even recruiting efforts.  
 
Figure 5.  Map of Muslim Population in Mindanao. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter described the circumstances that allowed ISIS to gain a foothold in 
Mindanao, including the success of ISIS in declaring the caliphate in Syria; the stalled 
 
 42 
peace negotiations in the Philippines following the Mamasapano Massacre; newly elected 
President Duterte’s shift from Islamist separatist groups in Mindanao to countering the 
drug trade in Luzon; and the security vacuum left in the region following the Joint 
Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) dissolution in 2015. The chapter 
then used relational analysis and visual analytics to consider the role that geographical 
proximity played with the groups that allied with ISIS, specifically ASG, Maute Group, 
BIFF, and AKP, which made up IS-P.  
This investigation demonstrates the aforementioned conditions, coupled with the 
opportunity to align with ISIS, enabled once-rival groups in Mindanao to set aside 
longstanding differences and unite to become IS-P, and this alliance allowed for these 
groups to combine their skills and resources to lay siege to Marawi in 2017. The next 
chapter examines the 2017 Battle of Marawi, and how groups aligned with ISIS used 
their geographic location and resources to hold the city for months.  
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IV. THE MARAWI SIEGE: A COMBINED IS-P OPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Throughout the summer of 2017, IS-P laid siege to Marawi City, which had a 
population of over 200,000 people, most of whom were Muslim.159 This battle was a 
major operation launched as a combined effort by the groups that pledged the bayat to 
ISIS: ASG, BIFF, Maute Group, and AKP, and is regarded as the longest and bloodiest 
Philippine military operation since World War II. The five-month battle between 
government forces and the ISIS-affiliated fighters ultimately resulted in the death of IS-P 
leader Hapilon and his deputy, Omar Maute of the Maute Group, along with 
approximately 165 Filipino soldiers and policemen, 920 militants, and more than 47 
civilians.160 The fighting left almost the entire population displaced and the city in 
ruins.161  
This chapter discusses the Siege of Marawi and analyzes how the different groups 
operated under the banner of IS-P. The first section presents a brief overview of the 
battle. The second section offers an analysis of the battle focusing on IS-P’s organization 
and ISIS support to IS-P; new TTPs used by IS-P; and IS-P claimed significant activities 
(SIGACT) during the siege. The third section offers concluding thoughts.  
This analysis reveals that the combined efforts of Maute Group, ASG, BIFF, and 
AKP created a formidable fighting force that required significant effort to put down. 
Within the battle IS-P used new TTPs, particularly urban warfare tactics, that presented 
considerable challenges to AFP. The battle also drew in foreign fighters from nearly a 
dozen countries. Ultimately, the combined resources of IS-P, coupled with foreign 
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fighters and urban TTPs made it possible for IS-P to fight off government troops for five 
months before being defeated.  
B. OVERVIEW OF THE BATTLE  
 Following the creation of IS-P around 2016, Isnilon Hapilon, the leader of ASG, 
along with the Maute brothers, Omar and Abdullah, began planning for the attack of 
Marawi in April 2017.162 Their intent was to carry out an attack on the first day of 
Ramadan, May 26, in order to seize the city and declare it a wilayat, or a province of 
ISIS.163 In preparation for the attack, IS-P fighters infiltrated the city under the cover of 
attending a gathering of Tablighi Jamaat, a transnational Sunni puritanical group that 
encourages greater piety among its followers.164 
 The original IS-P plan was foiled, however, when joint AFP and PNP elements 
raided Isnilon Hapilon’s safe house in Marawi City three days before the planned 
offensive, on May 23.165 During the initial raid, Hapilon’s guards and armed militants in 
the neighboring houses launched a substantial counterattack against government forces, 
which marked the beginning of the battle.166 At the start of the siege, the Philippine 
military claimed there were 50–100 fighters from ASG, 250–300 from the Maute Group, 
and 40 each from BIFF and AKP.167 There were also around 40 foreign fighters, mostly 
Indonesians and Malaysians, who fought under the banner of IS-P.168 Figure 6 depicts the 
locations of the initial actions of the IS-P fighters on May 23 as they fought off 
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government forces, and then withdrew to pre-designated strongholds across the city. 
Carmela Forbunea of Rappler reports the events that unfolded next: 
[a]rmed Marawi residents rush to the streets, wave the ISIS black flag, and 
attack strategic points around the city. They occupy Amai Pakpak Medical 
Center, harass Camp Ranao, and surround the City Hall. They release 
prisoners at the City Jail, set ablaze the Protestant-run Dansalan College 
and the Catholic Saint Mary’s Parish. They take hostages along the way, 
move towards Banggolo, the city’s commercial district.169  
Within hours, the insurgents controlled the vast majority of Marawi City.170 They 
established roadblocks and checkpoints along the roads and gained control of the three 
critical bridges linking the east and west portions of the city across the Agus River. 
President Duterte immediately declared martial law throughout Mindanao.171  
 
Figure 6.  Map of IS-P Attacks on May 23, 2017.172 
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The following day, on May 24, President Duterte suspended habeas corpus, and 
permitted warrantless arrests for the fighters responsible for the conflict.173 
Simultaneously, the military launched ground operations and air strikes against the 
insurgents.174 Michael Bueza of Rappler reports that, one week after the siege began, 
government forces rescued hundreds of hostages, and arrested more than 100 insurgents, 
including the surrender of eight fighters.175 AFP forces also recaptured parts of IS-P held 
territory in the city.176 IS-P fighters, however, established strong defensive positions in 
Marawi City’s financial district, and held civilian hostages, whom they used as human 
shields.177  
Fighting escalated in June.178 IS-P effectively used snipers to defend their 
positions against government forces that were primarily trained to fight conventionally 
and in rural terrain. The insurgents also used improvised explosive devices, Molotov 
Cocktails, and dug holes and tunnels to dodge government air strikes. Throughout these 
initial confrontations, insurgents resisted the AFP offensive. The military failed to meet a 
June 2 and later a June 12 deadline set by the government to recapture the city.179  
Despite its initial successes, IS-P fell into infighting over money and 
disagreements over decision making. Simultaneously, the groups began to run short on 
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ammunition and maneuver space as the AFP slowly gained ground in the city.180 Some of 
the insurgents attempted to flee the city but were executed by their leaders.181 The AFP 
recaptured two strategic bridges, the Mapandi Bridge in July and the Bayabao Bridge in 
September, which further restricted IS-P’s flow of resources for sustained operations.182 
Throughout the summer, air strikes and ground operations began to weaken the 
IS-P stronghold. On October 16, AFP forces located and killed Isnilon Hapilon and Omar 
Maute.183 That same day, President Duterte declared Marawi City liberated from militant 
influence and, on October 23, Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzo officially terminated 
combat operations in Marawi.184  
C. ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE 
The initial success of IS-P in holding the city, and their ability to conduct urban 
warfare and introduce new TTPs requires further analysis. This section focuses on three 
areas of IS-P in particular: the collaboration of the Maute Group, ASG, BIFF, and AKP 
to form IS-P, and the resources that ISIS provided to IS-P that enabled them to gain an 
initial advantage against the government troops; the new TTPs that IS-P adopted; and an 
analysis of ISIS claimed SIGACTs during the Siege of Marawai, using Visual Analytics. 
1. IS-P Collaboration and ISIS Resources in the Battle of Marawi 
Perhaps the most significant factor that led to IS-P’s initial success in the Battle of 
Marawi was the new collaboration that ISIS facilitated between the preexisting groups in 
the region, which allowed them to overcome historical differences and work together. 
First, IS-P created an organizational structure that allowed it work together more 
efficiently. Its organization was similar to a military’s task force where different units 
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form together to perform a specific task while still maintaining their independence from 
one another. For instance, the BIFF and AKP sent 40 fighters each, which was only a 
portion of their entire forces. Hapilon also brought along with him only 100 fighters and 
left most of his men in his Basilan base. These fighters augmented the Maute Group to 
form IS-P but they maintained their respective group identities. Like a task force where 
one unit takes the major role, the Maute Group was the lead force in IS-P’s battle for 
Marawi. It had the preponderance of forces and the mastery of terrain because Marawi 
was its home base.  
Yet, despite the Maute group’s knowledge of the battle space, Hapilon of ASG 
was clearly the commander of IS-P. This is evident in a propaganda video recovered from 
the battlefield that shows Hapilon making the final decision on plans developed by the 
Maute brothers.185 With Hapilon’s final decision on a course of action, Abdullah Maute 
was seen directing the attendees, presumably sub-leaders, to seize their targets. 
Furthermore, the footage also indicates that the IS-P was well-organized with a structured 
chain of command. Finally, the fighters in the video were speaking Tagalog as a common 
language, which allowed for communication amongst the different groups that had their 
own dialects.  
In addition to the collaboration of the groups under IS-P, ISIS also brought 
important resources to the Battle of Marawi. First, ISIS brought foreign fighters to the 
area. When the battle broke out in May 2017, ISIS media released a video encouraging its 
supporters to travel to the Philippines if they could not reach Iraq or Syria.186 At the 
conclusion of the Marawi Siege, the bodies of at least 13 foreign fighters from Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Chechnya, Yemen, India, Morocco, and Turkey 
confirmed that foreign support now included actual participation in combat operations.187 
Prior to ISIS, ASG and BIFF had links with transnational groups, such as AQ and JI, but 
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the extent of support these terrorist organizations provided was limited to mostly training 
and funding.188 
In addition to providing foreign fighters, ISIS also helped fund the groups and 
provided social media outlets. Rambo Talabong of Rappler claims that IS-P received at 
least $1.5 million from ISIS for the Marawi siege.189 ISIS also assisted IS-P by providing 
social media platforms like Facebook, Telegram, and Twitter to circulate videos and 
communicate IS-P messages and other information.190 TRAC assessed that IS-P may 
have been able to conduct the siege by themselves, but they would not have been as 
effective as they were in Marawi without these critical components of ISIS backing.191  
2. New TTPs in the Battle of Marawi 
 IS-P’s ability to defend urban terrain, combined with their employment of 
improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, and highly effective snipers, suggests that ISIS’s 
support of the siege brought resources and new TTPs with foreign fighters that came to 
fight alongside IS-P. Several of these TTPs deserve further analysis. 
First, IS-P made good use of urban terrain to fight AFP. A January 2018 AFP 
report titled “Operational Assessment on the Participation of Marine Operating Forces in 
the Joint Operations for the Liberation of Marawi City” describes how the enemy fighters 
maximized the battlefield terrain and actively employed their snipers in advantageous 
positions within the high-rise buildings throughout the city.192 The narrow alleyways 
between buildings effectively limited AFP troop movements, forcing them to navigate the 
city in single-file formations, making them vulnerable to these snipers. Snipers first 
located in a primary position. After engaging their targets, the fighters repositioned to 
                                                 
188  Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” CRS Report for 
Congress, n.d., CRS 4-5. 
189 Rambo Talabong, “PH Has Most ISIS-Claimed Attacks Outside Iraq, Syria – Report,” Rappler, 
October 25, 2017, http://www.rappler.com//nation/186299-philippines-country-most-isis-claimed-attacks-
outside-iraq-syria-trac-marawi. 
190 Talabong, "PH Has Most ISIS." 
191 Talabong, "PH Has Most ISIS." 
192 Charlie Domingo, Operational Assessment on the Participation of Marine Operating Forces in the 
Joint Operations for the Liberation of Marawi City (Taguig, Philippines: Philippine Marine Corps, January 
22, 2018), 43. 
 
 50 
alternate positions using tunnels. These locations are referred to as primary and alternate 
positions in Figure 7. The snipers then reengaged the troops, effectively paralyzing the 
AFP’s progress.  
 
Figure 7.  Deployment of IS-P Snipers.193 
Although the military held a numerically superior force, it proved to be 
insignificant because the troops did not have adequate space to fire and maneuver. IS-P 
fighters also used civilians as human shields, which further constrained the AFP’s ability 
to destroy the enemy.194 AFP troops were forced to conduct house-to-house and building-
to-building clearing operations that posed a significant threat to the forces due to 
effective preparations by the enemy and the difficulty of urban terrain.  
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IS-P’s success in exploiting the urban environment is evident in the AFP’s 
Operational Assessment Report of the June 9, 2017 ambush, when the Philippine Marines 
suffered 13 killed and 42 wounded.195 While attempting to clear a building, the Marines 
applied their usual TTPs for a jungle and rural environment. IS-P targeted the Marines 
with rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and improvised “incendiary bombs,” resulting in 
heavy casualties.196   
3. ISIS Claimed SIGACTS in the Siege of Marawi 
Throughout the summer of 2017, ISIS released reports of 103 SIGACTs in their 
siege of Marawi.197 These specific IS-P claimed SIGACTs are part of a wider set of more 
than 200 ISIS attacks that took place from May to September 2017 outside of Iraq and 
Syria, including in Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, and the Philippines. The SIGACTs were 
originally released through 99 messages spread across different social media outlets, 
primarily Telegram and Twitter, and span from May 21 to September 19.198  
TRAC Analysis compiled a specific list of SIGACTS from the Battle of Marawi. 
It notes that each incident represents “Islamic State operations that received actual printed 
claimseither Amaq News Agency communiques, or official statements under the 
Nashir Media House (official media outlet of the Islamic State).”199 The SIGACTs 
include small arms, IEDs, sniper, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). The SIGACTs 
also include other types of activities such as kidnappings, destroying property, acts of 
intimidation, and freeing prisoners. In Figure 8, the SIGACTs have been compiled into 
categories. The ‘Attacks (General)’ category includes small arms attacks, RPG attacks, 
indirect fire (IDF), and ambushes. The ‘Other’ category includes the freeing of prisoners 
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and fratricide. TRAC further compiled the SIGACTs by one of three groups: IS-East 
Asia, BIFF, or the Maute Group, and the SIGACTS are identified as being in either 
Marawi, Cotobato and Maguindanao areas. The SIGACTs claim a total of 829 killed and 
167 wounded from the AFP, along with the destruction of several AFP vehicles.  
 
Figure 8.   Count of ISIS Claimed SIGACTs by Location and Type.  
Although there are a total of 103 activities claimed by ISIS in this data set, it is 
possible that ISIS only claimed credit for activities that benefited their narrative and 
degraded that of the AFP. Additionally, as the fighting continued throughout the summer 
and AFP forces regained ground in the city, ISIS media may have exaggerated their 
messaging to maintain the appearance of strength in the siege.  
Figure 9 depicts locations where the SIGACTs took place, specifically in the main 
battle area of Marawi City, or in Cotobato and Maguindanao areas. The Maute Group is 
credited for the activities in Marawi, which was their home base along with the greater 
province of Lanao del Sur, while the BIFF claimed activities in their territories of 














Overall, these SIGACTs demonstrate how the bayat to ISIS allowed groups to 
work together in a coordinated effort that included both Marawi and the areas of 
Cotobato and Maguindanao.  
 
Figure 9.  Map of IS-P SIGACTs.  
Although IS-P engaged AFP forces in other areas, the main battle area of Marawi 
is where the majority of fighting took place. The ASG and Maute Group fighters used 
this operating space to hold out against the AFP. This area was one of the more densely 
populated areas of the city, full of multi-story and multi-room buildings that provided 
adequate cover for the fighters. Figure 10 depicts the SIGACTs locations concentrated in 
the main battle area of Marawi City. The map combines all IS-P TTPs including small 
arms, sniper, and RPG attacks. This figure demonstrates how the ASG and Maute Group 
positioned their fighters along several main roadways in the city and employed a 




Figure 10.  Map of SIGACTs over the Main Battle Area in Marawi City.  
Overall, the collaborative efforts of ASG, Maute Group, BIFF, and AKP, 
combined with new TTPs, especially urban operations, along with foreign fighters and 
resources, brought a new level of fight to Mindanao that completely caught the AFP off 
guard.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the Battle of Marawi and analyzed how the different groups 
operated under the banner of IS-P. Significantly, the combined efforts of groups that were 
historic rivals, coupled with new TTPs and financial, materiel and personnel resources 
from ISIS made the Battle of Marawi fierce, and required months to put down. The battle 
ended with hundreds dead and the destruction of most of the city.  
The next chapter offers summary remarks and proposes lessons learned from the 
creation of IS-P and the Battle of Marawi.  
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V. SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis aimed to investigate the following questions: What were the 
conditions under which ISIS emerged in Mindanao? How did ISIS come to have such a 
strong and growing presence in Mindanao? And, what can the Philippine government and 
the United States learn from the Battle of Marawi and how to counter the presence of 
ISIS and other potential trans-national Islamist movements in the region? The thesis 
investigated these questions by using a mixture of qualitative methods and visual 
analytics to understand the emergence of ISIS in the Philippines.  
The thesis explored these questions through three substantive chapters. Chapter II 
provided a historical overview of Mindanao stressing the core grievances that led to the 
formation of numerous insurgent groups opposed to the government. These groups 
existed for decades prior to the rise of ISIS in Mindanao and, together with these historic 
grievances, provided an opportunity for ISIS to gain a foothold in the region. Chapter III 
highlighted the near-term conditions that allowed for ISIS to emerge and take root in 
Mindanao. These conditions created a window of opportunity for already established 
Islamist groups to pledge the bayat—the oath of loyalty—to ISIS, and for ISIS to 
establish itself in the region. The chapter also used visual analytics to show where key 
groups that pledged allegiance operated in Mindanao, and how their alliance with ISIS 
allowed otherwise rival groups to begin to work together. Chapter IV provided an 
overview of the Battle of Marawi and analyzed how the different groups operated under 
the banner of IS-P, using visual analytics. This chapter also offered an analysis of IS-P’s 
organization, ISIS support to IS-P, and new TTPs that were introduced in the battle. The 
chapter concluded with an analysis of ISIS-claimed SIGACTs throughout the battle.  
This investigation found that the emergence of ISIS in Mindanao was deeply 
rooted in the historical development of the Philippines. Specifically, ISIS was able to 
build on grievances that traced back to 1565, when Spain colonized the Philippines and 
converted most Filipinos to the Catholic faith. Filipino Muslims in Mindanao, who did 
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not convert to Christianity, fought the Spaniards in what they believed was a defensive 
jihad to preserve the Islamic faith and to secure their freedom. When Spain lost the 
Philippines to the United States in 1898, it left behind a divided Christian and Muslim 
population.  
The divide between Christians and Muslims heightened during the American 
occupation when some state policies, such as Christian migration to Mindanao and 
parceling land to Christian settlers, resulted in the socio-economic marginalization of the 
Filipino Muslims. When the Philippines gained independence in 1946, the government, 
run mostly by Christians, further alienated the Filipino Muslims. The 1968 Jabidah 
Massacre that resulted in the death of 38 Filipino Muslims gave rise to a full-blown 
Muslim independence movement. This separatist movement sparked the founding of 
several insurgent groups, including the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and, later, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Maute 
Group, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFF), and Ansar al-Khilafah 
Philippines (AKP). However, ethnic diversity and regional differences prevented these 
groups from working together towards a common goal of independence.  
The rise of ISIS and its success in declaring the caliphate in Iraq and Syria 
changed dynamics between groups in Mindanao. Specifically, ISIS provided an 
overarching framework that allowed ASG, Maute Group, BIFF, and AKP to work 
together. Several events further facilitated the rise of ISIS in the region and made the 
alliance of ASG, Maute Group, BIFM, and AKP possible: the stalled Bangsamoro Basic 
Law, which was part of the peace negotiations between the MILF and the Government of 
the Philippines; the downplay of ISIS as a threat by two successive presidents; increased 
attention to the drug war at the expense of counterinsurgency in Mindanao; and the 
security vacuum left in the region following the dissolution of the Joint Special 
Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) in 2015. These overarching conditions 
allowed groups in the region to pledge their allegiance to ISIS and begin to work together 
relatively unobstructed.  
The newly formed IS-P demonstrated its lethality in the Battle of Marawai. On 
May 23, 2017, the four groups that became known as IS-P, laid siege to the city in an 
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attempt to make it a caliphate in Southeast Asia. With the support and influence of ISIS, 
IS-P surprised government troops with urban warfare tactics and new levels of lethality. 
In the end, the Battle of Marawi lasted for five months and required government forces to 
destroy almost the entire city in order to defeat the offensive.  
B. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This analysis of the rise of IS-P in Mindanao yielded five key findings that may 
have wider implications for countering the spread of ISIS through its alliances with local 
groups.  
1. ISIS Builds on Historical Grievances 
The grievances in Mindanao were not new, but ISIS was able to capitalize on 
these grievances for their own agenda. The Muslims’ struggle for independence, which 
began during the colonial period, was still prominent almost 500 years later and remains 
a core grievance of Muslims in the southern Philippines today. Different organizations 
representing the Muslim populace emerged beginning in the 1970s with the aim of 
fighting for independence, including through the use of Islamic ideology.  
ISIS capitalized on these grievances for its own gains, and it leveraged these 
preexisting groups to gain a foothold in the region. While the goal of ISIS was to create a 
global caliphate, something that is at odds with local ambitions for independent 
statehood, ISIS was able to draw on common themes to form a bond between groups in 
Mindanao and with ISIS leadership. These themes include the threat posed by “Christian” 
governments, the need for shariah to be law of the land, and the importance of jihad for 
independence and cleansing “Muslim” lands of non-Muslims. These themes allowed 
preexisting groups in Mindanao to align under the banner of ISIS, to work together, and 
to gain new resources in their fight for independence. 
2. ISIS Provides an Ideological Bridge between Rival Groups  
Perhaps most important for Islamist insurgent groups in the region, ISIS was able 
to shore up groups that had historical differences and unite these groups under its banner. 
In the Philippine case, preexisting groups and ISIS formed an alliance; this alliance 
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allowed groups that were otherwise rivals to work together and to provide ISIS with 
seasoned fighters. Each insurgent group was organized, trained, equipped, experienced 
and well-structured. For these groups, ISIS presented an opportunity to gain more 
credibility to further their goals. 
For ISIS, its goal of global expansion led to acceptance of the bayat pledged by 
these groups in Southeast Asia. The Philippines was a credible and useful affiliate mainly 
because of the existence of like-minded Muslim insurgent groups who fought for 
independence from a “Christian” government, and for their preexisting capabilities. By 
pledging the bayat, ASG, BIFF, Maute Group, and AKP were able to receive resources 
and support from ISIS that caught the AFP off guard.  
3. ISIS Brings Important Resources to the Fight  
Although groups in Mindanao were established and seasoned, ISIS brought 
important resources to the fight. Specifically, ISIS encouraged foreign fighters to come to 
Mindanao. At the conclusion of the Marawi siege, the bodies of at least 13 foreign 
fighters from Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Chechnya, Yemen, India, 
Morocco, and Turkey confirmed foreign fighter support for the battle. ISIS also provided 
financing. The groups that comprise IS-P received at least $1.5 million from ISIS to help 
in their operations in Marawi. ISIS further assisted IS-P by providing social media 
platforms like Facebook, Telegram, and Twitter to circulate videos and communicate IS-
P messages and other information. The groups in IS-P may have been able to conduct the 
siege by themselves; however, they would not have been as effective as they were in 
Marawi without these critical components of ISIS backing. 
Critically, ISIS also brought new TTPs to the fight. ISIS facilitated IS-P to defend 
urban terrain, emplace sophisticated IEDs throughout the city, target AFP with complex 
attacks that included small arms and RPGs, and employ highly effective snipers. The 
capability of the IS-P fighters to move out of their traditional jungle settings and fight an 
urban battle was critical to their lethality and in holding Marawi for such a long duration. 
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4. IS-P Required a New Response  
The Battle of Marawi offers wider implications for governments and regions 
fighting ISIS. The siege drew the AFP into a new form of fighting, urban warfare. 
Though the AFP had fought insurgent groups in the past, primarily using their jungle 
tactics, the combination of greater resources, new TTPs and foreign fighters engaging in 
urban combat forced AFP to develop new TTPs of their own to win the battle. The 
resistance posed by ASG, Maute Group, and the foreign fighters was a new level of 
combat for the AFP. These new TTPs allowed IS-P to gain initial successes before being 
defeated in Marawi, and allowed it to successfully hold the city for 154 days, costing 
approximately 165 AFP lives, 920 militant lives, and 47 civilian casualties. The fighting 
left almost the entire 200,000-person population displaced and the city in ruins. 
Furthermore, the rise of ISIS in Mindanao was not only a concern for the 
Philippines but also for the entire region and required new policies to address this threat. 
The influx of foreign fighters and resources to Mindanao exposed the need for regional 
cooperation to combat any further spread of ISIS. For example, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
the Philippines realized the need for a trilateral effort to secure their porous borders from 
being exploited by foreign fighters to move.200 Efforts to prevent the transfer of funds 
from ISIS to regional affiliates also requires the involvement of other international 
stakeholders. As the Government of the Philippines initially failed to appreciate the threat 
posed by ISIS, the recognition of the ISIS problem must be taken seriously throughout 
the region to avoid catastrophic losses like those seen in Marawi.  
Lastly, although the United States had ended its JSOTF-P task force and 
concluded Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, the rise of IS-P compelled the 
United States to reinitiate its support through Operation Pacific Eagle – Philippines, 
which began in late 2017. This new Overseas Contingency Operation, OCO, provides 
funding and authorizations to offer advice and assistance to the Government of the 
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Philippines in combating the ISIS threat. However, this new task force is still struggling 
with a wider strategy for ending the presence of ISIS in the region.  
5. Winning the Battle but Losing the War against ISIS  
The Battle of Marawi exemplifies the proverbial statement ‘Won the battle, but 
lost the war.’ The AFP was successful in ending the siege; however, they did not 
eradicate the groups responsible for the devastation of the battle. The expulsion of IS-P 
insurgents from Marawi City following the death of IS-P leaders Isnilon Hapilon and 
Omar Maute was a tactical victory, but the massive amount of destruction that the 
military inflicted on the city could be a source for eventual strategic defeat. The almost 
entirely Muslim population of Marawi is now left with a city in ruins, which is likely to 
further build resentment in the population. Although the Philippine government is taking 
measures to rebuild the city, it may not be fast enough or in a way that wins the support 
of the population. The citizens of Marawi may be ripe for further exploitation from 
insurgent groups and possibly transnational Islamist movements promising independence 
from a “Christian” government.  
Furthermore, the AFP was successful in eliminating two critical leaders, Isnilon 
Hapilon and Omar Maute; however, in November 2017, Sabahan Mohammad Amin 
Baco, an experienced Malaysian operative from Jemaah Islamiyah, assumed the role of 
‘Emir.’201 IS-P was still conducting lethal attacks in early 2018. In other words, despite 
the defeat of IS-P in the Battle of Marawi, the surviving Maute Group insurgents could 
still pose a significant threat.  
In addition, the BIFF fighters and the majority of ASG fighters in Basilan have 
remained strong. With ISIS still in the background, these groups are capable of resurging. 
They could further exploit IS-P’s five-month stand in Marawi and the military’s 
destruction of the city as propaganda to draw potential insurgents whose recruiting pool 
includes children and family members of slain militants and innocent civilians, along 
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with dissatisfied citizens who were displaced from the fighting. The complex situation in 
Mindanao still poses a dangerous environment for the resurgence of IS-P elements. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The investigation of the conditions that led up to the emergence of IS-P in 
Mindanao and their successful siege of the city of Marawi in 2017, followed by the 
almost total destruction of the city by the AFP, demonstrates the dangers posed by 
transnational Islamist movements like ISIS that can shore up differences between 
preexisting groups and bring new resources and TTPs to the fight. Although the 
Government of the Philippines won the Battle of Marawi, it still faces the ongoing threat 
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